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1. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SOUND RECORDING INDUSTRIES:
2002, at 1 tbl.1 (2004) (showing gross receipts for sound recording industries in excess of $15
billion), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0251i08t.pdf.
2. The Anti-Bootlegging Act consists of 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000), which contains civil
remedies, and 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000), which contains criminal penalties.  Bootlegging is the
unauthorized duplication of a commercially unreleased live performance for distribution; it is
distinct from piracy, which is the duplication of a sound recording that has already been
commercially released.  Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 209 n.2 (1985).  For example,
if people were to attend the next variety band concert at the local music café, record the show,
and then make it available to others when the artist chooses not to do so, they would be
engaging in bootlegging.  If, however, they were to make copies of the albums the variety band
sold and then give the albums to friends and family for Christmas, they would be engaging in
pirating.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
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NOTE
To Bootleg or Not to Bootleg?  Confusion Surrounding the
Constitutionality of the Anti-Bootlegging Act Continues
I. Introduction
Music is everywhere.  From the background music in the shopping mall
to the instrumental renditions of pop songs played in elevators, music
permeates the world.  Within this multi-billion dollar industry,  rights1
protection is a constant battle.  In 1994, Congress passed the Anti-
Bootlegging Act  (the Act) to protect one niche of the music industry by2
prohibiting the unauthorized recording and distribution of live performances.
While the Act withstood constitutional challenges for nearly a decade,
recent court decisions have exposed the Act’s fatal flaws.  These recent
decisions have created a jurisdictional split with one jurisdiction upholding
the Act’s constitutionality and two declaring the Act unconstitutional.  This
note explores the fatal flaws of the Act and the confusion surrounding the
Act’s constitutionality.
The U.S. Constitution expressly grants power to Congress to enact
copyright legislation under the Copyright Clause.   The Copyright Clause3
serves two purposes that are constantly in precarious balance with one
another.  On one side of the scale, the Copyright Clause attempts to protect
a creator’s artistic works against unauthorized use.  This protection
maximizes artists’ opportunities to profit and gives them greater incentive
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4. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (superseded by
statute on other grounds by 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1976)).
5. Id.; Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994).
6. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156.
7. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08 (2004)
[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966))
(recognizing that the same constitutional clause grants congressional power for both patent and
copyright protections).
8. See supra note 2.
9. 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
10. See supra note 3.
11. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, § 1.08 (listing scripts, motion pictures, and
written materials as well as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural art as being included within the
notion of fixation).
12. KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004),
vacated in part, KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc. (KISS II), 405 F. Supp. 2d
1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
to create works.   On the other side of the scale, the Copyright Clause limits4
authors’ monopolies over their works.   This limitation provides greater5
public access to works, thereby serving the public interest in using these
works for the benefit of society.   To maintain this balance, courts have6
relied on constitutional provisions that limit the kinds of materials afforded
copyright protection and the duration of that protection.   7
In 1994, Congress tested the limitations the Copyright Clause imposes by
passing the Anti-Bootlegging Act.   Nearly a decade later in United States8
v. Martignon,  a district court in New York determined that the Act was9
unconstitutional even though a prior case from another jurisdiction
previously upheld the Act’s constitutionality.  This note focuses on the Act
through the lens of the Martignon challenge, which exposed the Act’s failure
to satisfy the fixation and duration limitations that the Copyright Clause
imposes.  This note argues that the Act fails constitutional review because
(1) the Act protects works that are outside the realm of “fixed” works; (2)
the Act omits the required duration restrictions the Copyright Clause
imposes; and (3) Congress cannot simply circumvent Copyright Clause
limitations through use of the Commerce Clause.
The fixation requirement is based on the express protection of “writings”
under the Copyright Clause.   Fixation requires that protected works are to10
be recorded in some permanent form.   “[L]iterary works, musical works,11
dramatic works . . . pictures, sculptures, motion pictures, sound recordings,
[and] architectural drawings” all fulfill the fixation requirement.   While the12
fixation category has expanded over time, it has always protected only those
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/6
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13. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, § 1.08(C)(2) (citing Canadian Admiral Corp.
v. Rediffusion Inc., [1954] Ex. C.R. 382, 383).
14. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“securing for limited Times . . . exclusive Right to . . .
Writings and Discoveries”) (emphasis added).
15. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1994).
16. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209 (2003).
17. See supra note 2.
18. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 512-513, 108 Stat. 4809,
4974-76 (1994).
19. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
20. See David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1411-12 (1995).
21. 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
22. 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 824 (C.D. Cal. 2004), vacated in part, KISS Catalog, Ltd. v.
Passport Int’l Prods., Inc. (KISS II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
creations that at least have “some material form, capable of identification
and having a more or less permanent endurance.”13
The duration requirement is based on Constitutional text that limits
copyright protection to a discrete time period.   The duration restriction14
allows authors to capitalize on their product for a reasonable period of time
before permitting public access to the works.   While Congress has15
extended the duration of protection through the years, courts have not upheld
limitless protection.16
In 1994, Congress passed the Act  as part of an extensive agreement17
formed under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.   The Act protects live18
performances from unauthorized copying and distributing.   Critics,19
however, attacked the Act for failing to fulfill the basic tenets of copyright
law by expanding protection to “unfixed” works and by seemingly extending
indefinite protection to these works.   After three jurisdictions scrutinizing20
the Act failed to apply cohesive reasoning regarding the constitutionality of
the Act, confusion still exists among the jurisdictions.
Five years after the Act’s passage, the first case to challenge the Act’s
constitutionality, United States v. Moghadam,  reached the U.S. Court of21
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  The constitutional challenge in
Moghadam failed, but subsequent cases exposed the Act’s constitutional
deficiencies.  This note explores those cases that have challenged the Act’s
constitutionality and why the Act, in its current form, fails to withstand
constitutional attacks.
Part II of the note discusses the inception of the Act and the Act’s survival
of constitutional review in United States v. Moghadam.  Part III introduces
United States v. Martignon, which is the solitary case that has declared the
Act unconstitutional.  Part III continues with a brief discussion of KISS
Catalog v. Passport International Products,  which initially sided with22
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23. Todd D. Patterson, The Uruguay Round’s Anti-Bootlegging Provision: A Victory for
Musical Artists and Recording Companies, 15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 371, 380-83 (1997).
24. Id.  For example, written sheet music was protected but a sound recording on tape or
other medium was not protected.  Id. at 381.
25. Sound Recordings, Limited Copyright, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7)(2000)) (adding sound recordings to the list of protected works).
26. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 n.11 (1984).
27. Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
28. Section 512, 108 Stat. 4974 of the URAA was codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(2000).
Section 513, 108 Stat. 4975 of the URAA was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
29. Civil liability is encompassed in 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a):
XXx(a) Unauthorized Acts.—Anyone who, without the consent of the performer
Martignon, declaring the Act unconstitutional.  On rehearing, however, a
different judge followed the reasoning expounded in Moghadam and upheld
the Act as constitutional.  After the legislative and case history outlined in
Parts II and III, Part IV addresses the fixation and duration requirements of
copyright law and explains why the Act fails to satisfy both of these
requirements.  Drawing on Part IV’s conclusion that the Act fails to meet the
requirements of the Copyright Clause, Part V demonstrates that the
Copyright Clause serves as a grant of power as well as a limitation, and as
a limitation, Congress cannot simply evade copyright requirements through
use of the Commerce Clause.  As a result, the Act cannot rely on the
Commerce Clause to withstand a constitutional challenge.  Finally, despite
the Act’s unconstitutionality, Part VI explores why courts may nevertheless
find compelling justifications to uphold the Act and have done so in both
Moghadam and more recently in KISS Catalog.
II. Historical Background
A. Enactment and Scope of the Anti-Bootlegging Act
During much of U.S. copyright history, copyright law did not protect
audio recordings.   While early copyright law protected the reproduction of23
musical notations, it did not protect aural musical reproduction.   In 1971,24
Congress extended copyright protection for the music industry by passing
the Sound Recording Act of 1971,  which was intended to protect the music25
industry against the increase in piracy that had arisen as a result of the
invention of the audio tape recorder.   In 1994, Congress again expanded26
the sphere of protection afforded to the music industry by passing the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Uruguay Act),  which served as the basis27
for the later enacted Anti-Bootlegging Act.   The Act extends copyright28
protection to live performances for an unspecified time, imposes both civil




XXx(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance in
a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a
performance from an unauthorized fixation,
XXx(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sounds or sounds
and images of a live musical performance, or
XXx(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers to
rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in paragraph (1),
regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United States, shall be subject
to the remedies provided in sections 502 through 505, to the same extent as an
infringer of copyright.
XXx(b) Definition.—As used in this section, the term "traffic in" means transport,
transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another, as consideration for anything of
value, or make or obtain control of with intent to transport, transfer, or dispose of.
XXx(c) Applicability.—This section shall apply to any act or acts that occur on
or after the date of the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
XXx(d) State Law Not Preempted.—Nothing in this section may be construed to
annul or limit any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any
State.
Id.  Criminal liability is embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 2319A:
XXx(a) Offense.—Whoever, without the consent of the performer or performers
involved, knowingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain—
XXx(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance in
a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a
performance from an unauthorized fixation; 
XXx(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sounds or sounds
and images of a live musical performance; or
XXx(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers to
rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in paragraph (1),
regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United States; shall be
imprisoned for not more than 5 years or fined in the amount set forth in this title,
or both . . . .
Id.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2000).
31. See Nimmer, supra note 20, at 1399-1400, 1409-10.
32. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
33. Id. at 1271.
to those who copy or distribute the musical performance without the artist’s
permission.30
Academics criticize the Act on the basis of two constitutional
deficiencies.  First, the material the Act protects fails to fulfill the fixation
requirement. Second, by omitting a time limitation provision, the Act fails
to meet the duration requirement.   The first legal challenge to the Act arose31
in United States v. Moghadam  where the Eleventh Circuit upheld the32
constitutionality of the Act’s criminal provisions.33
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34. Id.
35. Id. at 1271 n.1.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1271.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1274.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1275.
44. Id. at 1276.
B. The First Challenge to the Act’s Constitutionality Failed
1. Background of Moghadam
On March 27, 1997, Ali Moghadam was indicted under the Act for
participating in the sale and distribution of bootlegged recordings.34
Moghadam ultimately pled guilty to the charges against him.   Moghadam,35
however, expressly reserved the right to appeal his conviction on the ground
that the Act under which he was charged was unconstitutional.   The Florida36
district court held that the statute was constitutional.   Moghadam37
subsequently appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.38
2. The Moghadam Court Determined That the Commerce Clause Was a
Sufficient Basis for the Act’s Passage
After extensive discussion, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the Act
was constitutional and upheld Moghadam’s conviction.   In its analysis, the39
appellate court declined to decide whether live performances fell within the
copyright fixation requirement, but instead concluded that an alternative
source of congressional power justified the Act.   Rather than address the40
Copyright Clause, the court determined that the Anti-Bootlegging Act was
a valid exercise of legislative power under the Commerce Clause.   41
Commerce Clause legislation requires only that a rational basis exist to
justify the legislation.   In Moghadam, the court found that such a rational42
basis existed to protect the creative works of musicians against unauthorized
use.   Furthermore, the court found that the connection between the43
objective of the Act and interstate commerce was evident because
bootlegged recordings were sold for financial gain across state boundaries.44
The court also stated that the Act’s legislative history did not discuss its
enactment under the Commerce Clause because the events surrounding the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/6
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45. Id. at 1275-76 (stating that the specific context under which the Act was passed was in
the midst of world treaties attempting to protect intellectual property in international commerce).
46. Id. at 1277.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1282.
49. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), reh’g denied, 193 F.3d
525 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000).
50. Id.
51. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
52. Judge Tosses Bootleg Law, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), Sept. 25, 2004, at A14.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000); Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
54. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
Act’s passage were sufficient to infer that it was passed as commercial
legislation.45
After concluding that the Act’s passage was justifiable under the
Commerce Clause, the court determined that the Copyright Clause did not
prevent Congress from passing the Act using its Commerce Clause powers.46
The court stated, “each of the powers of Congress is alternative to all of the
other powers, and what cannot be done under the powers of one . . . may
very well be doable under another.”   Thus, the court upheld Moghadam’s47
conviction, concluding that the Act was valid under the Commerce Clause
and that Congress’s powers were independent rather than mutually
exclusive.   The Eleventh Circuit subsequently denied Moghadam a48
rehearing en banc,  and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari,  leaving49 50
open the possibility for a subsequent challenge to the Act’s constitutionality
in another circuit.  Shortly thereafter, such a challenge arose in the Southern
District of New York in United States v. Martignon.51
III. Martignon Declares the Act Unconstitutional, but KISS Follows the
Moghadam Reasoning and Upholds the Act’s Constitutionality
A. Background to the Martignon Dispute
In September 2003, federal and state law enforcement, working with
Recording Industry Association of America officials, arrested Jean
Martignon for selling approximately one thousand bootlegged concert
sessions from his Midnight Records store in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2319A,
the criminal provision of the Act.   This criminal provision prohibits the52
sale of unauthorized musical recordings and establishes criminal penalties
for its violation.   In his defense, Martignon claimed that the Act was53
unconstitutional.54
The district court considered the same two issues that the Moghadam
court previously addressed.  The first issue was whether the Act complied
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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55. Id. at 422.
56. Id. at 424.
57. Id. at 425.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 424.
60. Id. at 420-22.
61. Id. at 420.
62. Id. at 423-25.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 423.
65. Id. at 424 n.13.
66. Id.
with the requirements of the Copyright Clause.   The second issue was55
whether Congress could circumvent the limitations of the Copyright Clause
by using its Commerce Clause powers.56
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit, the Martignon court determined that
the Act failed to satisfy the requirements of the Copyright Clause and that
Congress could not accomplish indirectly through the Commerce Clause
what it could not do directly under the Copyright Clause.   Consequently,57
the court declared the Act unconstitutional.58
B. Reasoning for the Martignon Decision
The Martignon court determined that the Act violated both the fixation
and duration requirements of the Copyright Clause.   The court concluded59
that the historical context surrounding the passage of the Act indicated that
Congress enacted the legislation pursuant to its Copyright Clause powers.60
The court relied, in part, on the wording of the Act to determine that its
purpose was “synonymous with that of the Copyright Clause.”   The court61
then discussed why the Act failed to satisfy both the fixation and duration
requirements of the Copyright Clause.62
The court determined that the Act failed to satisfy the Copyright Clause
fixation requirement because the Act protected live performances which are
not “writings” that receive Constitutional protection under the Copyright
Clause.   The court stated that “[w]hile the category of ‘writings’ has63
expanded over time, it has never moved into the realm of unfixed works.”64
The court noted that Congress arguably intended to expand the term
“writings” under the Constitution to include live performances that are not
recorded.   To do so, however, the court found that Congress should have65
manifested such legislative intent in some express manner.   Because no66
such discussion existed in the Act’s legislative history, the court concluded
that Congress did not intend to expand the writings definition in such a
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/6
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67. Id. at 424.
68. Id. at 422-24.





74. Id. at 425 n.14.
75. Id. at 429-30.
76. KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 824 (C.D. Cal. 2004),
vacated in part, KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc. (KISS II), 405 F. Supp. 2d
1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
77. Id. at 824-25.
dramatic way.   Because Congress failed to explicitly express the intent to67
expand the meaning of the “writings” requirement and because live
performances had never been categorized as a “writing,” the court concluded
that the Act failed to meet the fixation requirement of the Copyright
Clause.68
Furthermore, the court held that the Act failed to meet the Copyright
Clause’s duration restriction.   Specifically, the Act contained no provision69
regarding the length of time for which unfixed live performances were
protected.   The Constitution specifically states that protection shall be70
granted for a “limited” time.   Therefore, the Act did not fall within the71
constitutional limitations of the Copyright Clause.72
Once the court determined that the Act was not valid within the scope of
the Copyright Clause, the court then addressed the Commerce Clause and
concluded that Congress “[m]ay [n]ot [d]o [i]ndirectly [w]hat [i]t [i]s
[f]orbidden [t]o [d]o [d]irectly.”   In other words, Congress could not73
circumvent the Copyright Clause’s limitations by relying on the Commerce
Clause as its legislative basis for passing the Act.  Because the court
determined that Congress could not avoid the limitations on its power under
the Copyright Clause through reliance on another congressional power, the
court did not analyze whether the Act was permissible under Congress’s
commerce power.   Ultimately, the court declared the Act unconstitutional74
and dismissed the charges against Martignon.75
C. The Act Fails, Then Survives, Constitutionality Review in California
Following Moghadam and Martignon, a district court in California
determined that the civil section of the Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1101, was
unconstitutional because it did not limit the duration of protection.   In KISS76
Catalog, the owners of the intellectual property rights of the rock band KISS
sued the distributor of DVDs that featured KISS performances.   The77
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78. Id. at 831-32.
79. Id. at 833.
80. KISS II, 405 F. Supp. at 1170.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1171.
84. Id. at 1173.
Central District of California indicated that the Act might not fail the
fixation requirement,  but, similarly to Martignon, the KISS Catalog court78
held that the Act was unconstitutional because it failed to limit the duration
of protection.   In a subsequent reconsideration, however, the district court79
overturned its previous ruling and determined that the Commerce Clause
justified the constitutionality of the Act.   80
In June 2005, Judge Rea of the Central District granted the request of the
United States to intervene in the KISS Catalog action.  After Judge Rea’s
untimely death, the matter was transferred to Judge Fischer  who81
determined in KISS II that the previous KISS Catalog ruling failed “fully to
consider the position of the United States”; therefore, an abuse of discretion
occurred.   Judge Fischer determined that the Moghadam court correctly82
determined that the Act could be passed under Commerce Clause powers.83
Furthermore, Judge Fischer concluded that the Act is not “‘[f]undamentally
[i]nconsistent’ [w]ith the Copyright Clause.”84
The conflict among the Moghadam, KISS II, and Martignon decisions
demonstrates the confusion surrounding the validity of the Act.  Moreover,
the inconsistent rulings of Judge Rea and Judge Fischer from the same
district court further highlight the need for clarification of the Act itself and
the Act’s constitutionality.
IV. The Act Fails to Fulfill the Constitutional Requirements of the
Copyright Clause
A. The Act Fails to Satisfy the Fixation Requirement by Granting
Copyright Protection to Performances That Fail to Meet Traditional
Copyright Requirements
As illustrated in Martignon, the Act cannot be justified under the
Copyright Clause because live performances protected by the Act fail to
fulfill the fixation requirement that the Copyright Clause imposes.  For a
work to receive statutory copyright protection, it must be “fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
[it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/6
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85. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, § 2.03(B) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000)).
86. See supra note 3.
87. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, § 1.08(C)(2) (citing Canadian Admiral Corp.
v. Rediffusion Inc., [1954] Ex. C.R. 382, 383).
88. Id.
89. The term “writings” was expanded to include grooves on a phonograph record even
though these grooves could not literally be read with the naked eye, as was required under early
interpretations of the term.  Id. § 2.05(A) (distinguishing protection afforded to phonorecords
and other similar devices from an earlier case in which piano rolls were held to be non-
infringing because they did not constitute “intelligible notation” for the purposes of a writing).
90. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (referring to original copyright
statutes that protected only maps, charts, and books under the writings requirement and the
gradual expansion of the term “writings” to include additional works).
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8.
92. KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(quoting Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561, for the proposition that “‘any physical rendering of the
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor’” may constitute a “writing”), vacated in part,
KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc. (KISS II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal.
2005); Dunham v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 152, 153 (D. Mass. 1953) (“It is fundamental
in copyright law that to obtain protection an author’s ideas must be reduced to concrete form.”).
93. See, e.g., Brian F. Fitzgerald, Digital Property: The Ultimate Boundary?, 7 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 47 (2001).
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”   The concept of fixation85
arises from the constitutional requirement that Congress may protect only
“writings.”   Courts have defined the term “writings” to mean that works86
must at least have “some material form, capable of identification and having
a more or less permanent endurance.”   Live television broadcasts,87
performances of plays, and musical compositions do not fall within this
definition of a “writing” and therefore do not fulfill the fixation
requirement.   Although Congress has progressively expanded the notion88
of “writings” to include additional areas, such as grooves on a phonograph
record,  protected areas have always existed in some fixed, tangible, or89
durable form.90
Copyright protection is reserved under the Constitution for those works
that fulfill the fixation requirement.   Live performances, by their very91
nature, are not fixed in form but rather are ephemeral musical expressions
that disappear as soon as they are performed.  No extension of the fixation
requirement to date possibly encompasses a live performance within the
fixation definition.   While some legal scholars have argued that current92
copyright law may not adequately protect modern digital recordings and
creations,  arguments for extending fixation to the digital realm are93
inapplicable to the protection of live performances under the Act.  The Act’s
protections do not extend to new technological forms of expression but
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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94. Joseph C. Merschman, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting
the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L.
REV. 661, 682 (2002).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (containing general provisions for copyright protection).
97. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51-58 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664-
71.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 52-56, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5665-70.
100. Id. at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5665.
101. Id. at 52-53, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5665-66.
102. Id. at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5665.
rather attempt to protect a form of expression that has existed since the
drafting of the Constitution.  Live musical performances existed at the time
the Framers drafted the Copyright Clause “writings” requirement; thus, if
the Framers so desired, they could have included such performances within
the realm of protection.   Instead, the Framers chose to limit copyright94
protection only to those works that qualified as a “writing.”  95
Legislative history surrounding the passage of the general copyright
statute embodied, in part, in 17 U.S.C. § 102  further supports the argument96
that live performances alone do not fulfill the fixation requirement.   In the97
1976 Copyrights Act House Report accompanying the previously mentioned
general copyright statute, the Committee on the Judiciary discussed how the
fixation requirement applied to the broadcasting of live events.   The98
Committee understood that it needed to clarify how live events fulfilled the
fixation requirement and thereby received protection.   Regarding sporting99
events, the report stated that if an event were first recorded and subsequently
broadcasted, it would qualify as a motion picture and thereby receive
copyright protection.   Furthermore, the report stated that if an event were100
simultaneously broadcasted and recorded, it should receive the same
protection that would be afforded if there were some slight delay in the
broadcast.   The report further indicated, however, that unfixed works,101
such as unrecorded choreographic works, performances, or broadcasts,
would not receive federal protection, but could be protected under state
common law or statutes.   The legislative history indicates that live102
performances were, at least in 1976, included in the category of unfixed




103. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000) (absence of any discussion
related to specified period for protection).




108. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
110. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.  The petitioners did not challenge extension with respect to
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works).
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B. The Act Fails to Fulfill the Duration Requirement
In addition to not fulfilling the fixation requirement, the Act also fails to
limit the duration of copyright protection.   The duration requirement for103
copyright legislation strikes a balance between two desirable, yet
conflicting, social values.   Authors of copyrighted works need protection104
to profit from their works.   The public as a whole, however, is interested105
in benefiting from these works.   Congress and the courts have relied on106
copyright limitations to establish a balance between these two competing
interests by allowing authors to have a monopoly over their works for a
limited period of time before allowing the public free access to the works
after the monopoly expires.107
The difficult nature of maintaining this balance between protecting
private rights and allowing public access received national media attention
following the Supreme Court decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft.   The108
petitioners in Eldred argued that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act (the CTEA),  which extended copyright protections for already109
existing works to seventy years, was unconstitutional.   The Eldred110
petitioners claimed that the CTEA violated the constitutional duration
requirement and the First Amendment.   The petitioners argued that the111
constitutional duration limitations affix to a work when the work is created,
and because the limitation is constitutional in nature, Congress may not
thereafter modify or expand the duration of protection afforded to the
work.   The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ arguments.   In doing112 113
so, the Court emphasized that the CTEA did not create perpetual copyright
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protection but rather simply extended the time of protection, which Congress
had done on several prior occasions.114
The Eldred Court noted that while the Copyright Clause empowers
Congress to afford copyright protection to works for limited times, the
Copyright Clause does not set limitations on the exact duration of
protection.   Although Congress has increased the allotted time of115
protection on four different occasions, it has not extended the duration
requirement to an unlimited time period.   Opponents of the CTEA feared116
that Congress’s ability to continuously extend the term of copyright
protection essentially equated to unlimited protection.   The Court,117
however, noted that the CTEA was not an attempt to extend unbounded
protection to copyrighted materials but rather was a necessary step to align
U.S. copyright protections with intellectual property protections in foreign
countries.118
Although, like the CTEA, Congress passed the Act to more closely align
U.S. copyright protections with those afforded in other countries,  the119
drafters of the Act completely omitted a duration restriction, thereby making
the Act incompatible with existing U.S. copyright law.   By failing to limit120
the duration of protection, Congress created a realm of indefinite protection
for performances that arguably do not even qualify as “written” works
entitled to protection under the Copyright Clause.   Omitting the duration121
requirement alone nullifies the Act as an improper use of the powers granted
to Congress under the Copyright Clause, according to language in Eldred.122
Moghadam, KISS Catalog, and Martignon all recognized the durational
deficiencies of the Act,  but the Moghadam court sidestepped the123
durational deficiency issue because the defendant failed to raise that issue
on appeal and the court declined to do so sua sponte.   The Moghadam124
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court and the KISS II court both relied on the alternate power of the
Commerce Clause to justify the Act’s passage.   The Moghadam and KISS125
II reasoning is flawed, however, because Congress may not simply use
another power, such as the Commerce Clause power, to circumvent
Copyright Clause limitations.  126
V. The Commerce Clause Cannot Be Used to Bypass Restrictions
Contained in Other Constitutional Clauses
At the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that congressional acts are constitutional only if one of the
enumerated powers in the Constitution supports the act.   The “powers of127
the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”   Courts must afford128
due respect, however, to congressional actions and only invalidate
legislation “upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds.”   Congressional attempts to regulate areas not129
sufficiently related to interstate commerce pursuant to Congress’s
Commerce Clause power have led to judicial limitations.   The Act,130
however, does not fail as being insufficiently related to interstate commerce
but fails because the Copyright Clause serves as “both a grant of power and
a limitation.”   Therefore, limitations contained within the Copyright131
Clause may not be overborne simply through use of another constitutionally
granted power.
A. If No Limitations Existed, the Commerce Clause Could Support
Passage of the Act
The Commerce Clause gives broad power to Congress to regulate
commerce “among the several States.”   Under the Commerce Clause,132
Congress may “‘regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
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threat may come only from intrastate activities.’”   For Congress to pass133
legislation under the Commerce Clause, the regulated activity must
substantially affect interstate commerce, a determination that only the courts
can make.   To determine whether a particular activity substantially affects134
interstate commerce, courts may look to legislative findings surrounding the
passing of an act.   Such legislative findings, however, are instructive but135
not binding on a court’s final determination.136
Bootlegged recordings, undoubtedly, substantially affect interstate
commerce; therefore, the Commerce Clause could theoretically justify the
Act’s passage, but for other limitations.  The Act targets the unauthorized
recording, transmission, and distribution of live performances.   While the137
simple act of recording arguably does not extend beyond state lines, nor
affect commerce, the distribution of such recordings has generated millions
of dollars in sales outside legitimate distribution chains.   The Moghadam138
court recognized the Act’s substantial connection to interstate commerce and
indicated that the relationship between the Act and the Commerce Clause
was self-evident.  The court based its reasoning, in part, on the fact that the
Act regulates sales.   Therefore, the Act fell easily within regulated139
interstate commerce activities.  140
B. Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Demonstrates That the Act Cannot
Overcome Copyright Clause Restrictions Through Reliance on the
Commerce Clause
 Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons  best exemplifies the141
argument that the Commerce Clause is limited by other constitutional
provisions.  In Gibbons, the Supreme Court struck down the Rock Island
Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act (the RITA) because it
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violated the limitations that the Bankruptcy Clause  of the Constitution142
imposes on Congress.   The Bankruptcy Clause grants Congress the power143
to “establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States.”144
In its decision, the Gibbons Court first determined that Congress passed
RITA which applied only to bankrupt regional railroads, pursuant to its
power under the Bankruptcy Clause.   The Court then examined whether145
RITA violated the “uniform Laws” provision of the Bankruptcy Clause.146
The Court reasoned that an act focused solely on regional bankruptcies
could hardly claim to fall within the “uniform Laws” provision under the
Bankruptcy Clause because regional regulation did not rise to the level of a
uniform, national standard.   The Court also concluded that the Bankruptcy147
Clause served not only as an affirmative grant of power to Congress but also
as a limitation on that power.   Under the limitation, Congress could only148
enact uniform bankruptcy laws.   After the Court determined that the149
Bankruptcy Clause limited Congress, the Court explained that the
Commerce Clause could not justify a law that failed under the Bankruptcy
Clause’s restrictions.   The Court stated: “[i]f [it] were to hold that150
Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, [it] would eradicate from the Constitution a
limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”151
The Court’s reasoning in Gibbons provides a suitable comparison for
analysis of the Act.  The language of the Copyright Clause is very similar to
that of the Bankruptcy Clause because both clauses grant Congress the
power to pass laws within the context of a few expressed limitations.   The152
Bankruptcy Clause contains the limitation that Congress may establish only
“uniform Laws,”  while the limitations contained in the Copyright Clause153
require that copyright protections be subject to the fixation and duration
requirements.   The U.S. Supreme Court determined in Gibbons that154
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Congress may not avoid limitations on its power by simply resorting to
another listed power for passage of an act.   Therefore, a similar155
application of this principle would render the Act unconstitutional because
the Act fails to satisfy the requirements of the Copyright Clause, and the
Commerce Clause may not be used to overcome these deficiencies.
In KISS II Judge Fischer erroneously distinguished Gibbons to determine
that the reasoning applied therein was inapplicable to the Act.   Judge156
Fischer differentiated the case on the basis that, in Gibbons, Congress had
attempted to pass a bankruptcy statute instead of a bankruptcy-like statute.157
This distinction rests, however, on the determination that the Act is
copyright-like legislation and not intended to be copyright legislation.  As
noted previously, the legislative history surrounding the Act fails to provide
any guidance regarding whether the Act was simply meant to be copyright-
like or was an extension of copyright protections to previously unprotected
performances.  The language of the Act itself supports a conclusion that the
Act is copyright legislation rather than copyright-like legislation.  According
to the Act, violators “shall be subject to the remedies provided in sections
502 through 505, to the same extent as an infringer of copyright.”158
Reliance on other Commerce Clause jurisprudence to justify the
constitutionality of the Act is misplaced.  The government in Martignon, and
again in KISS II, claimed that the Trade-Mark Cases  supported the159
proposition that Congress may in fact use its commerce power to sidestep
the limitations of the Copyright Clause.   In the Trade-Mark Cases, the160
Supreme Court struck down a series of trademark laws, holding that these
laws neither satisfied the requirements of the Copyright Clause nor fell
under the appropriate scope of the Commerce Clause, as the clause had been
interpreted at that time.   In Martignon, the government contended that161
because the Court in the Trade-Mark Cases considered the passage of the
Trademark Acts as potentially within the scope of the Commerce Clause
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/6
2005] NOTE 741
162. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 427.  The Commerce Clause argument was ultimately
unsuccessful in the Trade-Mark Cases because the then-accepted scope of the Commerce Clause
did not encompass the actions regulated.  Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 98-99.
163. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (2000) (specifically requiring that the protected mark be
used in commerce).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000).  The Act is contained within a statute containing other
copyright protections and purports to extend these same protections to a different type of work,
which is completely different from recognizing a new set of rights on any works.
168. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999).
169. 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986).
170. 17 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
171. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279.
power,  the Martignon court should have similarly looked to the Commerce162
Clause for the congressional right to pass the Act.163
The government’s argument, however, failed to recognize the inherent
differences between copyright protection and trademark protection.
“Copyright law . . . protects the fruits of intellectual labor.”   Trademark164
protection, on the other hand, arises only from use of a word or mark
attached to goods or services in commerce and protects the consumer against
product confusion and unfair competition.   Trademark laws were overtly165
passed under the Commerce Clause and are inherently legislation governing
commerce.   Because trademark law is derived from a separate166
constitutional power than is copyright law, the limitations that exist for
copyright law would not apply to trademark law.  While trademark law
recognizes the right to exclusive use of a word or mark in order to prevent
public confusion, the Act attempts to expand an already existing right, that
of copyrights, to other previously unprotected works, which fall outside the
Copyright Clause’s fixation and duration requirements.   Thus, the167
government’s reliance on the Trade-Mark Cases is misplaced to the extent
that it is used to justify passage of the Act under the Commerce Clause. 
In Moghadam,  the government again contended that the Commerce168
Clause was suitable for passing the Act but instead relied on Authors League
of America, Inc. v. Oman.   In Authors League, the Second Circuit169
scrutinized the constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. § 601 (the Manufacturing
Act).   The Manufacturing Act, now expired, once protected the domestic170
book publishing industry “by restricting the importation of copyrighted,
nondramatic literary works which were published abroad.”   The plaintiff171
in Authors League argued that the Manufacturing Act failed to satisfy the
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Copyright Clause because the legislation was merely protectionist economic
legislation and did not serve the purpose of protecting the useful arts.172
The Authors League court determined that it was inconsequential whether
the Manufacturing Act failed under the Copyright Clause because Congress
could pass legislation under many different powers listed in the
Constitution.   The Court addressed the plaintiff’s argument by stating:173
[w]hat plaintiff’s argument fails to acknowledge, however, is that
the copyright clause is not the only constitutional source of
congressional power that could justify [the Manufacturing Act].
In our view, denial of copyright protection to certain foreign-
manufactured works is clearly justified as an exercise of the
legislature’s power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.174
Although the Authors League reasoning supports the use of the
Commerce Clause to pass copyright legislation, such reasoning is not
appropriately suited to justify the passage of the Act when the Act openly
conflicts with requirements of the Copyright Clause.  First, the Authors
League court did not definitively state that the Manufacturing Act failed to
satisfy the requirements of the Copyright Clause.   Furthermore, the175
plaintiff’s argument was not premised on one of the traditionally accepted
limitations of the Copyright Clause, such as the duration and fixation
requirements.   Instead, the plaintiffs in Authors League claimed that the176
Manufacturing Act failed to promote the progress of the useful arts, arguing
that “protection of the domestic printing industry [was] only tenuously
related to the goal sought to be furthered by the granting of a copyright.”177
This argument did not contend that the Manufacturing Act failed to meet the
requirements of the Copyright Clause but rather that the Manufacturing Act
did not fall directly within the definition the plaintiffs set forth regarding
progress of the arts.  Therefore, the court rightly decided that it could look
to other congressional powers to support passage of the Manufacturing
Act.178
The reasoning relied on in Authors League and the Trade-Mark Cases
fails to support use of the Commerce Clause for the Act’s passage.
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Furthermore, compelling policy reasons also exist to prohibit a Commerce
Clause justification of the Act.
C. Ramifications of Allowing Congress to Pass Copyright Legislation
Under the Commerce Clause
By allowing Congress to circumvent the Copyright Clause limitations
through use of the Commerce Clause, courts have ignored the fundamental
premise that exists in copyright law.  Copyrights serve not only to protect
authors but also to benefit the public by increasing creative materials
available to the public.   By protecting live performances for an179
unspecified period of time, Congress granted live performers all of the
benefits of copyright but deprived the public of any rights it would normally
possess under existing copyright law.  While copyright protections have
been greatly increased throughout the last decade,  such unchecked180
expansion defeats the justification for monopoly-like control when it fails
to balance the public’s right to use and benefit from the works.
Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause to bypass Copyright Clause
restrictions is not only unconstitutional for failing to satisfy the fixation and
duration requirements of the Copyright Clause, but also threatens U.S.
copyright law as interpreted since the Constitution was enacted.  The U.S.
Supreme Court determined that Congress may enact legislation under the
Commerce Clause when a rational basis exists for concluding that the
activity being governed substantially affects interstate commerce.   Under181
the Act, Congress regulates the purchase and sale of music recordings that
undoubtedly pass through channels of interstate commerce during
distribution.   Therefore, regulating the purchase and sale of these182
recordings falls within the province of the Commerce Clause.  This initial
conclusion, however, fails to address the broader concern of using the
Commerce Clause to enact legislation forbidden by other constitutional
limitations.  The Eleventh Circuit, in Moghadam, sidestepped this
conundrum by stating “as a general matter, the fact that legislation reaches
beyond the limits of one grant of legislative power has no bearing on
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whether it can be sustained under another.”   If this line of reasoning were183
applied as a blanket rule, the Commerce Clause would render useless many
provisions of the Constitution.   Ultimately, allowing Congress to sidestep184
express constitutional limitations by simply resorting to a different
enumerated power nullifies the Framers’ intent in drafting the Copyright
Clause.
Justice Thomas noted the danger of relying on a broad “substantial
effects” test for applying the use of the Commerce Clause power in his
United States v. Lopez  concurrence: “[p]ut simply, much if not all of Art.185
I, § 8 (including portions of the Commerce Clause itself), would be
surplusage if Congress had been given authority over matters that
substantially affect interstate commerce.”   Justice Thomas also stated:186
“This [substantial effects] test, if taken to its logical extreme, would give
Congress a ‘police power’ over all aspects of American life.”   Upholding187
the Act as a constitutional exercise of congressional power would reinforce
Justice Thomas’s belief that the Commerce Clause and the substantial
effects test have nullified other Article I provisions of the Constitution such
as the Copyright Clause.  Declaring the Act unconstitutional, however, could
produce the negative effects associated with violating international
agreements.
VI. Higher Courts May Find Compelling Reasons for Upholding the Act
and Expanding Notions of Copyright Law
A. Ramifications of Nullifying the Act
As previously discussed,  the Act was passed pursuant to the Uruguay188
Round Agreements.   The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of189
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) embodies the international measures
agreed to in the Uruguay Rounds.   Unlike many international treaties,190
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TRIPS extends far beyond simply incorporating a treaty into a governmental
scheme because it contains its own enforcement provisions.191
Because of failing conventional intellectual property protection, the
TRIPS committee incorporated enforcement mechanisms that immediately
penalize those countries that fail to appropriately regulate intellectual
property rights within their borders.   In the past, individuals were forced192
to seek retribution in the countries where infringement was occurring, which
was often a difficult and costly endeavor for foreigners.   Under TRIPS,193
however, governments may now impose importation tariffs as a result of
infringement complaints.194
Should the Act be declared unconstitutional, the United States may
violate the TRIPS agreement and be subject to sanctions from other parties
to TRIPS.  Whether sanctions would in fact be imposed is unclear because
enforcement of these provisions has yet to occur.  Appellate courts may
consider These potential sanctions as they consider Martignon and
determine whether the Act is void as an unconstitutional use of power by
Congress, or whether the Act should survive through a circuitous analysis
like that applied in Moghadam.   To avoid international repercussions,195
reviewing courts may, whether justifiably or not, extend the scope of U.S.
copyright law beyond traditionally accepted parameters.
B. The Supreme Court, As It Has Done Historically, May Decide to
Expand the Fixation Requirement
Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided to review the
constitutionality of the Act, the increasing split among jurisdictions may
motivate the Court to review the Act.  While current interpretations of the
fixation requirement exclude live performances from the constitutional
“writings” standard, the U.S. Supreme Court may, as it has done in the past
expand the realm of fixed works, and include live performances therein.  In
the early copyright case of Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau,  Judge196
Learned Hand stated that the Constitution’s
grants of power to Congress comprise, not only what was then
known, but what the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter.
Of course, the new subject-matter must have some relation to the
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grant; but we interpret it by the general practices of civilized
peoples in similar fields, for it is not a strait-jacket, but a charter
for a living people.197
If the Supreme Court construes the fixation requirement in light of the
Act, the Court could find that Judge Hand’s statement provides a strong
basis for extending fixation to include those works protected under the Act.
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, it was possibly inconceivable
that live performances could be easily and instantaneously recorded in the
manner possible today.  Technological changes resulting in the ease of
recording live performance may also  influence the Court to extend
protection to live performance.  Furthermore, recent criticism focuses on the
rigidity of the fixation requirement, which results in the exclusion of certain
ethnic works from copyright protection.   Traditional views of the fixation198
requirement prohibit certain cultures from protecting works that have been
passed down orally for generations but are not embodied in written form.199
Courts, as well as Congress, may view the need to provide equal protection
for creative works of all cultures as further impetus for extending the
fixation requirement to include works that have not traditionally fulfilled the
fixation requirement such as aural presentations and the extensively
discussed live performances. 
VII. Conclusion
While the Act stood for nearly a decade before it was declared
unconstitutional in Martignon, the passage of time did not absolve the Act
of its original constitutional deficiencies.  Even though the Moghadam
challenge was severely weakened by Moghadam’s failure to preserve for
appeal the issue of the Act’s noncompliance with the duration requirement,
the subsequent Martignon decision aptly exposed the Act’s flaws.
Notwithstanding the Martignon reasoning, the confusion surrounding the
Act’s constitutionality is evident in the contradicting decisions of
Moghadam and Martignon and in the changing KISS Catalog decisions, in
which one judge determined that the Act was unconstitutional, but another
judge, on rehearing, determined that the Act was constitutional.
Amid the confusion, the Act continues to fail to meet the Copyright
Clause fixation requirement by extending protection to unrecorded live
performances that do not fit within the currently accepted realm of fixed
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works.  And even if the Act were to overcome its fixation failure, the Act
fails to meet the Copyright Clause’s duration requirement.  While Congress
could easily overcome the duration deficiency by adding a short clause
limiting the time of protection, Congress has not yet chosen to do so.  Until
a limitation is imposed, the Act blatantly fails constitutional review for its
lack of a duration limitation.
Furthermore, the Act cannot simply escape the Copyright Clause
limitations through reliance on the Commerce Clause.  Allowing Congress
to sidestep limitations set forth under one clause through use of power found
under another clause would completely undermine the checks the
Constitution provides.
Notwithstanding the Act’s constitutional failure as recognized in
Martignon and discussed above, the Supreme Court, along with other
reviewing courts, may be highly motivated to uphold the Act as
constitutional to support the United States’s attempts to conform to
international intellectual property agreements.  Until the Act is amended to
comply with Copyright Clause restrictions or until the Supreme Court rules
on the Act’s constitutionality, confusion like that demonstrated by the
differing opinions in Maghadam, Martignon, and the two divergent KISS
Catalog decisions will continue to surround scrutiny of the Act.
Andrew B. Peterson
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